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t would be so pleasant, to honour my good colleague 
and friend, Leonard, by writing a little discourse on the pleasures 
of playing together Mozart’s great Divertimento in E♭ K563, the 
challenges of those awkward double stops in that arrangement of 
Bach’s magnificent Goldberg Variations, or our regular bemusement 
in working out whether a hemidemisemiquaver is a thirty-second or 
a sixty-fourth note. But sadly, I suspect such a discourse might not 
weave very fluidly into the texture of this learned collection. So I will 
instead pay tribute to Leonard with a paper that hopefully combines 
some of his long-standing academic as well as personal interests: in 
the fundamentals of European Union law, in the diversity of national 
constitutional experiences, and in the sad fate of the UK as it drifts 
down into the lonely depths of Brexit.  
To be more precise: this contribution examines the United King-
dom Internal Market Act 2020 (UKIMA 2020). In some respects, 
this important legislative initiative has already received its fair share 
of international attention – thanks largely to the Johnson Govern-
ment’s aborted plans consciously and deliberately to breach its own 
I 
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legally binding obligations, under the EU-UK Withdrawal Agree-
ment, designed to avoid a hard border across the island of Ireland.1 
However, the primary focus of the UKIMA 2020 in fact lies else-
where: introducing a new body of rules to govern the general system 
of internal trade relations between the constituent territories of the 
UK as from expiry of the Brexit transition period on 1 January 2021. 
On the one hand, some form of internal trade framework is certainly 
needed: the devolution settlements introduced across the UK in the 
late 1990s mean that – once the unifying framework of EU trade law 
is removed – the British market is capable of fragmenting through 
the creation of internal trade barriers and distortions of competition. 
On the other hand, the robust market access principles contained in 
the UKIMA have potentially fundamental repercussions, certainly 
for the constitutional context of devolution, and most likely for its 
practical operation as well.  
In Section 1, we recall some of the key questions and challenges 
that face the architects of any internal market. In Section 2, we high-
light the main lessons that the UK should really have learned about 
internal market building after 45 years as a leading member of the 
Union. Section 3 then identifies the particular empirical and consti-
tutional characteristics of the UK that one would expect should in-
fluence the design and operation of its own fledging internal market. 
In Section 4, we summarise the key provisions of the UKIMA 2020 
before proceeding, in Section 5, to query how far the UK’s core char-
acteristics are indeed well reflected in the final terms of the legislation. 
Our conclusion can be brief, since the answer is: not very well. 
1.   Some Key Questions and Challenges  
for Any Internal Market 
Any project of market integration between two or more territories, 
each with their own regulatory jurisdiction and the capacity to enact 
 
1 See further, e.g. Editorial Comments, ‘Sour Lessons from the Union’s First 
Encounters with the UK as a ‘Free and Sovereign Country’’, 58(1) CMLRev (2021) 
p. 1-12. 
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different rules, will be shaped by certain fundamental decisions 
about the scope and structure of their cross-border economic coop-
eration.  
To begin with, the parties need to decide on their level or depth of 
ambition. After all, different theories of cross-border trade offer very 
different views about how far regulatory differences should even be 
regarded as a problem.2 Will barriers to trade be defined only nar-
rowly (no tariffs, border controls or overt protectionism); or more 
expansively – covering also regulatory obstacles arising from the mere 
existence of variations in how different territories regulate the sale of 
goods or provision of services? Will variable regulatory compliance 
costs be considered an artificial distortion of competition that needs 
to be eliminated; or a stimulant to healthy rivalry between jurisdic-
tions, spurring them to attract investment through innovation; or ra-
ther an invitation to social dumping and the trigger for a regulatory 
race to the bottom?  
Those questions are far from simply logical or self-executing, but 
rather laden with underpinning assumptions and subjective prefer-
ences. For their part, lawyers offer policymakers a ‘toolkit’ of trade 
principles that can be employed in order to translate the necessary 
policy choices into a more concrete regulatory reality. In particular, 
the legal architects of any internal market can call upon several key 
techniques of market management: towards one extreme, the cen-
tralised harmonisation of regulatory standards; towards the other ex-
treme, a mere prohibition of discrimination (direct and indirect); but 
perhaps most significant of all, the principle of mutual recognition.3   
 
2 From a vast literature, consider, e.g. S. Deakin and F. Wilkinson, ‘Rights vs. 
Efficiency? The Economic Case for Transnational Labour Standards’, 23(4) ILJ 
(1994) p. 289-310; A. Ogus, ‘Competition Between National Legal Systems: A 
Contribution of Economic Analysis to Comparative Law,’ 48(2) ICLQ (1999) 
p. 405-418; D. Esty & D. Geradin (eds), Regulatory Competition and Economic 
Integration: Comparative Perspectives (Oxford University Press 2001). 
3 Again from a vast literature, see further, e.g. K. Armstrong, ‘Mutual Recognition’ 
in C. Barnard and J. Scott (eds), The Legal Foundations of the Single Market: 
Unpacking the Premises (Hart Publishing 2002); F. Kostoris Padoa Schioppa (ed.), 
The Principle of Mutual Recognition in the European Integration Process (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2005).  
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Mutual recognition solves the problem of barriers to trade in a 
straightforward way: differences in national law are left in place, but 
cannot be used as an excuse to hinder the free sale of goods and pro-
vision of services. However, mutual recognition obviously preserves 
any distortions of competition that might arise from differential 
compliance costs – thereby facilitating regulatory competition and, 
in many eyes, increasing the risk of social dumping. Moreover, mu-
tual recognition places significant limits on the ability of any given 
territory to set and enforce its own distinctive social policy choices in 
a truly effective and systematic manner – even for and within its own 
jurisdiction. For those reasons, a trade system that relies on extensive 
commitments to mutual recognition is also likely to incorporate safe-
guards, for example, allowing a host territory still to enforce its higher 
regulatory standards against incoming goods and services, for the 
sake of protecting important public interest goals. 
In reality, of course, no internal market is going to be built simply 
upon one single definition, say, of a barrier to trade; or by using just 
one method of market management, like harmonisation. Instead, we 
have to experiment with how tools such as harmonisation, non-dis-
crimination and mutual recognition can be combined together, 
adapted and qualified, so as to construct a workable system that man-
ages to reconcile the potentially competing interests at stake. And 
also ask a series of other important questions. For example: which 
‘flanking policies’ will be required to ensure that greater economic 
integration is based on competition which is both free and fair: rules 
on competition and state subsidies, minimum social and environ-
mental standards etc? Or again: which institutions, structures and 
processes are needed to operationalise the entire system in practice: 
who makes key decisions about when and how to harmonise; who 
determines when the public interest in high standards of regulatory 
protection outweighs the public interest in greater competition and 
consumer choice; who has the ultimate power to settle disputes 
about the basic ‘rules of the game’? Indeed, the answers to such ques-
tions about flanking policies and governance frameworks will invari-
ably have a decisive bearing, back upon the very scope and depth of 
trade ambition that underpins their internal market. 
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In exploring those challenges and hammering out workable solu-
tions, trade lawyers have learned several important general lessons. 
First, every internal market is a product of its own unique circum-
stances and conditions – which will affect the many choices to be 
made and the complex balances to be struck: what works for the US 
will not necessarily succeed in Europe, and vice versa.4 Secondly, even 
within any given internal market: the precise choices we make will 
inevitably vary from sector to sector; and the balance struck or com-
promises reached will change and evolve over time. Internal markets 
are not end-states or final destinations: they are ongoing frameworks 
and processes for managing economic relations between their con-
stituent territories. Thirdly, what all internal markets do generally 
have in common is the need for mutual trust between their constitu-
ent territories. A system, for example, that offers its participants an 
effective voice, through relatively independent and impartial institu-
tions and processes, will surely prove more satisfactory and durable 
than one which instead treats certain territories as more inherently 
important or privileged than others.5 
2.   Lessons from the EU Experience of Building and  
Maintaining the Single Market  
All of those policy challenges, legal solutions and common lessons 
are well illustrated by considering the Union’s own long experience 
of market integration. In the EU context, we tend to distinguish be-
tween two basic situations: what happens in the absence of any cen-
tralised harmonisation, when market regulation is left to each Mem-
ber State in the exercise of its sovereign competence; and then what 
 
4 Consider, e.g. M. Egan, Single Markets: Integration in Europe and the United States 
(Oxford University Press 2014). There is also an extensive literature comparing the 
EU experience with other regional systems of economic integration, e.g. Mercosur 
and ASEAN.  
5 Consider, e.g. P. Cramér, ‘Reflections on the Roles of Mutual Trust in EU Law’, in 
M. Dougan and S. Currie (eds), 50 Years of the European Treaties: Looking Back and 
Thinking Forward (Hart Publishing 2009); M. Möstl, ‘Preconditions and limits in 
mutual recognition’, 47(2) CMLRev (2010) p. 405-436. 
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happens after the Union has decided to adopt common standards, to 
be applied across the Member States. 
In the absence of central harmonisation, Union law operates on the 
basis of the approach first laid down by the CJEU in the Cassis de 
Dijon case – perhaps the most famous judicial decision ever delivered 
in the field of cross-border trade and internal market management.6 
According to Cassis de Dijon: each Member State is free to regulate 
its own market as it sees fit – but subject to a presumption of mutual 
recognition, so that goods lawfully made and services lawfully pro-
vided in one Member State can be lawfully sold and provided in every 
other Member State as well. However, that presumption of mutual 
recognition is not absolute: it can be rebutted by the host state on a 
wide range of public interest grounds – not just public health or se-
curity, but also, for example, environmental, labour or consumer 
protection – any one of which might justify the host state insisting 
that imported goods or services still need to meet its particular regu-
latory standards. 
But there is, of course, also a power of central harmonisation at the 
Union level – capable of displacing or superseding the default rules 
on free movement provided for under Cassis de Dijon. However, in 
many sectors, Union-level harmonisation tends to be relatively ad 
hoc in nature – intervening to tackle specific problems or challenges, 
with no ambition to create a more comprehensive regulatory code. 
Moreover, Union-level harmonisation is often relatively limited in 
scope – defining only those common standards needed to protect the 
essential public interest requirements at stake in any given field, but 
otherwise leaving all remaining (non-essential) regulatory choices to 
the individual Member States. Nevertheless, the very fact that such 
limited harmonisation has been achieved, is still capable of justifying 
a much stronger obligation of mutual recognition: the grounds for 
limiting cross-border trade now tend to be more narrowly and 
 
6 C-120/78, Rewe-Zentral v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, 
ECLI:EU:C:1979:42. 
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strictly defined, for example, to deal with unforeseen events or public 
safety emergencies.7 
In addition, the Union places great emphasis on the effective pur-
suit of various ‘flanking policies’ (as they would be seen from a trade 
perspective) – designed to ensure that the competitive forces gener-
ated within the internal market are both properly free and suitably 
fair: the rules on competition law and state aid, as well as minimum 
standards of social and environmental protection. By those com-
bined means, the Union removes many barriers to trade (but not all); 
eliminates certain distortions of competition (but not every one of 
them); and controls the conditions for regulatory competition be-
tween states (though without excluding it entirely). And as we said 
before: the precise balance struck naturally varies across sectors and 
changes across time.8 
Just as importantly: the Union’s particular approach to internal 
market building has not evolved in the abstract; it is shaped by the 
co-evolution of a unique institutional structure – one that seeks to 
facilitate and service the operation of its internal market.9 We have a 
central Union legislature, designed to ensure a balanced representa-
tion of interests – which, in the case of the Member States acting to-
gether in the Council, is influenced but not entirely determined by 
 
7 Particularly under the ‘new approach to harmonisation’ inaugurated by the 
Commission’s White Paper on Completing the Internal Market, COM (1985) 310 
Final. See further, e.g. C.D. Ehlermann, ‘The Internal Market Following the Single 
European Act’, 24(3) CMLRev (1987) p. 361-409; J. Pelkmans, ‘The New 
Approach to Technical Harmonisation and Standardisation’, 25(3) JCMS (1987) 
p. 249-269. 
8 See further, e.g. A. McGee & S. Weatherill, ‘The Evolution of the Single Market: 
Harmonisation or Liberalisation’, 53(5) MLR (1990) p. 578-596; N. Reich, 
‘Competition Between Legal Orders: A New Paradigm of EC Law?’, 29(5) CMLRev 
(1992) p. 861-896; R. Van den Bergh, ‘The Subsidiarity Principle in European 
Community Law: Some Insights From Law and Economics’, 1(4) MJ (1994) p. 337-
366; J. Smits, ‘A European Private Law as a Mixed Legal System: Towards a Ius 
Commune through the Free Movement of Legal Rules’, 5(4) MJ (1998) p. 328-340. 
9 And of course, it is this constitutional and institutional dimension to European law 
that has provided the focus of Leonard’s research and to which he has made such 
important contributions, e.g. L.F.M. Besselink, A Composite European Constitution 
(Europa Law Publishing 2007). 
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population size. Moreover, thanks to the principle of conferral, the 
Union’s powers of central harmonisation are exhaustively listed and 
their exercise has to be justified on objective grounds; while in any 
case, Union legislation must comply with various principles designed 
to protect the interests of its constituent territories (such as subsidi-
arity).10 
Furthermore, the Single Market is dependent upon complex ad-
ministrative structures – generally centred around the European 
Commission, but largely comprising networks of national civil serv-
ants – which together monitor and enforce the system: exchanging 
information, coordinating responses, allocating jurisdiction, decid-
ing on market authorisations, penalising infractions etc. And there 
are equally complex judicial structures – dependent on the central 
authority of the Court of Justice, but again based primarily on the 
work of the national courts across each Member State – that inter-
pret and apply the Single Market rules. Indeed: perhaps the most 
striking institutional aspect of the Union system is the enormous im-
portance placed on the need for genuinely independent and impar-
tial systems of administrative and judicial supervision, dispute settle-
ment and enforcement – crucial for generating and sustaining the 
sense of mutual trust upon which the operation and durability of the 
entire edifice depends. Conversely, this careful system of checks and 
balances means that the Member States feel relatively comfortable 
about the idea that the main Single Market rules enjoy direct legal 
enforceability before the courts at the behest of natural and legal per-
sons.11  
3.  Framing the UK Debate About the  
Post-Brexit ‘Internal Market’ 
Of course: just because something works well for the EU, does not 
mean that it will work for anyone or anywhere else. In this section, 
 
10 See further, e.g. N. Nic Shuibhne (ed.), Regulating the Internal Market (Edward 
Elgar Publishing 2006). 
11 I.e. through principles such as direct effect, disapplication and the award of 
Francovich damages. 
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we will consider some of the key contextual factors that are directly 
relevant to the UK debate about its own fledgling internal market.12  
The regulation of internal UK trade was not considered a signifi-
cant issue or problem until the decision to leave the European Union. 
After all, when the UK first joined the European Economic Com-
munities in 1973, there was no system of devolution allowing Scot-
land or Wales to engage in their own distinctive legislative activities. 
And when devolution did occur in the late 1990s, the application of 
common EU rules helped to structure not only the UK’s trade rela-
tions with other Member States but also the internal operation of the 
UK market itself.13 Whatever problems did arise, concerning differ-
ential regulatory treatment across England, Scotland and Wales, were 
regarded as sufficiently marginal and/or exceptional as to be consid-
ered perfectly tolerable.14  
However, withdrawal from the EU has made it important to decide 
how far regulatory differences across the constituent territories of the 
UK will impact upon internal trade in goods and services. True: the 
precise scale of this problem remains unclear – not least given the 
novelty, complexity and uncertainty of the situation now facing the 
UK. But there is good reason to believe that the issue of intra-UK 
regulatory divergence, and the consequent need for internal market 
management, will indeed become a significant practical matter. After 
all, the UK Government has itself repeatedly promised that Brexit 
will lead to a significant expansion in devolved competences.15  
 
12 Note that we will concentrate on the position of England, Scotland and Wales – 
the situation of Northern Ireland being distinguished and considerably complicated, 
in particular, by the Protocol on Ireland / Northern Ireland contained in the EU-UK 
Withdrawal Agreement [2019] OJ C 384 I. 
13 Devolution was introduced under the Labour Government led by Tony Blair, in 
particular, through the Scotland Act 1998 and the Government of Wales Act 1998. 
14 One of the most high profile examples being the charging of differential university 
tuition fees to Scottish residents and EU students (on the one hand) as compared to 
other UK residents and international students (on the other hand).  
15 E.g. HMG, The United Kingdom’s exit from and new partnership with the 
European Union (Cm 9417 of 2 February 2017); HMG, White Paper on the UK 
Internal Market (CP 278 of 16 July 2020). 
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So what primary factors does the UK need to take into account, 
when thinking about the design of its own internal market? In that 
regard, there is one fundamental and indeed overriding fact that the 
UKIM has to confront – and which makes the challenges facing the 
British completely unique when compared, say, to the EU or the US, 
Canada or Australia. We can conveniently refer to that fundamental 
fact as ‘the English Problem’: this is an internal market made up of a 
relatively small number of territories, where just one of those territo-
ries alone accounts for over 4/5 of the total population and econ-
omy.16 Within the UK economy: the productive capacities of Scot-
land and Wales, as regards the manufacture of goods and supply of 
services, are extremely limited as compared to those of England; in-
deed, for the supply of many different types of goods, Scotland and 
Wales are largely or even entirely dependent upon England to supply 
their own markets, businesses and consumers. 
Moreover, thanks to the traditional constitutional principle of 
(Westminster) parliamentary sovereignty, the UK is an internal mar-
ket where that same empirically dominant territory also exercises 
overwhelming control over the central institutions of the state as a 
whole. England as such has no separate or distinct institutions for 
itself, while English political representatives enjoy the ability to use 
the UK state’s shared institutions to overrule or override the compe-
tences and choices of its smaller neighbours.17 That is particularly 
true in light of the judgment of the UK Supreme Court in Miller: 
the so-called ‘Sewell Convention’, which requires the consent of the 
devolved administrations to any UK-wide legislation capable of im-
pinging upon devolved matters, is merely a political practice that is 
not to be treated as legally enforceable via the courts.18 
Against that background, it is obvious that principles which might 
work well in an internal market such as that of the Union, will simply 
not operate in the same manner in the peculiar context of the UK. 
 
16 England makes up almost 85% of the total UK population; Scotland around 8%; 
Wales slightly less than 5%; Northern Ireland just under 3%. 
17 Notwithstanding minor reforms such as ‘English votes for English laws’ 
procedures in the House of Commons. 
18 Miller [2017] UKSC 5. 
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For example, imagine that the UK were to introduce a strong system 
of mutual recognition: whatever the competences of the devolved in-
stitutions on paper, the ability of English goods and services freely to 
access the markets in Scotland or Wales would, in practice, make it 
much more difficult for the devolved institutions to adopt or enforce 
different or higher regulatory standards of their own. Such standards 
will effectively disadvantage domestic producers and suppliers; while 
the potential scale of English imports would, in many circumstances, 
simply negate any prospect of Scotland or Wales delivering on their 
desired public interest objectives. 
For those reasons, any UKIM ‘toolkit’ should ideally incorporate 
proper and effective safeguards for the devolved institutions – ena-
bling them to adopt different social choices without the risk, not so 
much that London might directly and formally overrule them at will, 
say, by imposing centrally harmonised standards; as that the free mar-
ket access of English goods or services into Scotland and Wales might 
simply render autonomous devolved choices redundant in practice. 
Otherwise, there is a serious risk that the UKIM will not merely re-
flect but positively reinforce and indeed magnify the empirical and 
constitutional facts of English dominance within the UK.  
Indeed: a strong system of mutual recognition, without any other 
corrective to protect devolved competences, might in some situations 
render the need for centralised harmonisation effectively redundant 
and therefore reduce the incentive for the central government to en-
gage in negotiation or seek consensus with the devolved administra-
tions.  
Among the many challenges that the outcome of the 2016 referen-
dum has posed for devolution,19 is the question of how Brexit will 
impact upon the scope and exercise of devolved competences.20 As 
that wide-ranging question became wrapped up with initial deliber-
ations about the more specific design of the UKIM, the authorities 
 
19 See further, e.g. J. Hunt, ‘Devolution’ in M. Dougan (ed.), The UK After Brexit: 
Legal and Policy Challenges (Intersentia 2017); A. Young, ‘The Constitutional 
Implications of Brexit’, 23(4) European Public Law (2017) p. 757-786. 
20 Not least under the system of ‘retained EU law’ provided for under the European 
Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018.  
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in London, Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast were engaged in discus-
sions about the development of ‘common frameworks’ that might 
serve both to stabilise the UK’s immediate post-Brexit regulatory en-
vironment, while also helping to manage future internal trade rela-
tions.21 Those discussions have not always progressed smoothly, but 
they have certainly progressed. To cut across those sectoral negotia-
tions, by introducing a horizontal principle to manage internal trade, 
such as a strong obligation of mutual recognition, could undermine 
the entire philosophy of the ‘common frameworks’ approach. After 
all: why should London bother to try to negotiate, or even impose, 
harmonised rules for the whole of the UK, when it can just adopt 
rules to suit England and then let market forces take over – projecting 
the effects of English rules into the territories of Scotland and Wales; 
in fact, pressurising Edinburgh and Cardiff simply to follow the Eng-
lish rules themselves as well? 
4.   Core Provisions of the UKIMA 2020 
Yet that is precisely the sort of internal market model that the UK 
Government proposed under its UKIM Bill of September 2020,22 
and which the Westminster Parliament ultimately endorsed in enact-
ing the final UKIMA 2020.23 The UKIM will indeed be based on 
strong principles of free market access, with only limited opportuni-
ties for the devolved institutions to enforce their own divergent laws 
against English imports, reinforced by the ability of businesses and 
individuals to go to the courts and have devolved legislation disap-
plied in practice. To illustrate those propositions, we will now sum-
marise the core provisions of the UKIMA 2020 – focusing on the 
rules concerning trade in goods, rather than those that address trade 
in services or the mutual recognition of professional qualifications – 
 
21 See further the official documentation and regular reports available via 
gov.uk/government/collections/uk-common-frameworks. 
22 Available at publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/58-01/0177/20177.pdf. 
23 Available at legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2020/27/pdfs/ukpga_20200027_en.pdf. 
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though many of the same issues arise also in relation to those provi-
sions.24 
In the field of goods, the UKIMA 2020 creates a system of internal 
UK trade based on two ‘market access principles’: mutual recogni-
tion (applicable to certain types of rules) and non-discrimination 
(applicable by default to another category of rules).25  
The Act lays down certain basic limits to the scope of those market 
access principles: for example, they only apply to sales made in the 
course of a business; though they do not apply to sales, even if made 
in the course of a business, but only for the purpose of performing a 
public function.26Moreover, both mutual recognition and non-dis-
crimination are intended to be largely prospective in effect: subject 
to certain conditions, they will not apply to existing rules. However, 
the Act would kick in, if and when any existing provisions are 
amended in a substantive way; and will in any case apply to all new 
regulatory requirements introduced by the competent authorities.27  
For new or substantively amended rules, the main market access 
principle is mutual recognition.28 The latter will apply to all rules 
governing (what in EU law terms would be known as) product re-
quirements: regulatory standards affecting issues such as ingredients, 
composition, packaging and labelling.29  Here, the Act offers only 
very limited opportunities, say, for Scotland to insist upon applying 
its own standards to English imports: mutual recognition can be de-
nied only to deal with highly specific problems, such as the spread of 
 
24 See Part 2 and Schedule 2 on services and Part 3 on professional qualifications / 
regulation. Note that the Act also contains additional provisions, e.g. on trade 
between Northern Ireland and Great Britain in accordance with the Protocol on 
Ireland / Northern Ireland (see sections 10(7) and 11, Part 5 and section 55). 
25 Section 1(1)-(2). Though this does not prevent traders from complying with all 
relevant local rules: section 14. 
26 Section 15 – with the concept of ‘public function’ presumably having a similar 
meaning as it does, in English law, to delimit the scope of domestic administrative 
law or the application of the Human Rights Act 1998. Also Schedule 1, e.g. para 11 
on the exclusion of taxation powers. 
27 Section 4 on mutual recognition; section 9 on non-discrimination. 
28 Section 2. 
29 Section 3. 
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pests, diseases or unsafe foodstuffs; and even then, only under strictly 
controlled conditions.30 There is no wider system of justifications or 
derogations, even for general threats to public health; let alone issues 
such as environmental, consumer or employment protection. 
Besides the core principle of mutual recognition for product re-
quirements, the Act also contains a principle of non-discrimination, 
covering both direct and indirect discrimination.31 Non-discrimina-
tion will apply to a second and distinct body of new or substantively 
amended rules, i.e. those governing (what in EU law terms would be 
known as) selling arrangements – such as advertising regulations, 
shop opening restrictions or licensing requirements.32 If there is di-
rect discrimination against other UK goods, it can only be justified 
on very specific grounds, such as dealing with a ‘public health emer-
gency’ posing an ‘extraordinary threat’ to human health.33 If there is 
indirect discrimination against other UK goods, then it can be justi-
fied if the measures can reasonably be considered a necessary means 
to protect either life and health, or public safety and security.34 
The final version of the UKIMA 2020 contains certain provisions, 
added after publication of the original proposals, to clarify precisely 
which rules should be subject to full mutual recognition, as opposed 
to which rules should instead be governed only by non-discrimina-
tion. In particular: when the UKIM Bill was first published, it was 
unclear how, for example, rules on the minimum pricing of goods 
such as alcohol should be classified: were they closer to product re-
quirements, governed by mutual recognition; or to selling arrange-
ments, subject to non-discrimination? 35  The final UKIMA 2020 
 
30 Schedule 1, especially paras 1 and 2. 
31 Sections 5, 7 and 8. Though see Schedule 1, para 12 for a specific exclusion from 
the definition of indirect discrimination under the Act.  
32 Section 6. 
33 Schedule 1, especially paras 1 and 5. 
34 Section 8(1) and (6). 
35 This issue has particular resonance in Scotland, since it is bound up with public 
health efforts to combat excessive alcohol consumption. Readers will recall the 
ruling, under EU free movement law, in C-333/14, Scottish Whisky Association, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:845. 
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therefore creates a specific category called ‘manner of sale require-
ments’ – rules regulating the circumstances or manner in which 
goods are sold (such as place or time of sale, sale by whom or to whom, 
or the price and other terms of sale). Such manner of sale require-
ments will generally be governed by the principle of non-discrimina-
tion – unless they appear to be artificially designed simply to avoid 
classification as a product requirement and thus full application of 
the principle of mutual recognition.36  
Having created this set of market access guarantees for goods, the 
UK Government seems to envisage that the new rules will be en-
forced and applied on the ground, primarily through the work of ex-
isting regulators and other public authorities, acting under more de-
tailed guidance from ministers in London.37 The UKIMA 2020 also 
contains detailed provisions on the future role of the Competition 
and Markets Authority (including a new Office for the Internal Mar-
ket) in monitoring and reporting on the operation of the UKIM, as 
well as providing advice on its implementation and development.38 
However, there will also be an important role for the courts. In par-
ticular: although the Act states that the market access principles for 
goods have no direct legal effect except as provided for under the leg-
islation,39 the relevant provisions on mutual recognition and non-
discrimination make clear that any offending trade restrictions are in 
fact to be treated as inapplicable to or unenforceable against pro-
tected traders.40  
5.   Critical Comments on the Nature and Design of the UKIM 
In some respects, the UKIMA 2020 draws extensively upon the in-
tellectual heritage of Union law. And yet the UKIM is also 
 
36 Section 3(4)-(6).  
37 Section 12. 
38 Part 4 and Schedule 3. 
39 Section 1(3). 
40 E.g. section 2(3) on mutual recognition; section 5(3) on non-discrimination. 
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fundamentally different from the Single Market – both on paper and, 
one can safely assume, in practice.41 
On paper, i.e. taken simply on its own terms, the Act is based upon 
a strong, if not radical, market dynamic: strict guarantees of market 
access, capable of overriding or bypassing local regulatory choices, 
subject to only very limited opportunities for exclusion or justifica-
tion. Indeed: the UKIMA 2020 is effectively ‘Cassis de Dijon on ster-
oids’: market integration is not just a presumption, but an almost ab-
solute rule; there is barely any system of derogations allowing host 
territories to defend their regulatory standards in the public interest.  
Even in the best of circumstances, the UKIM rules are capable of 
generating significant deregulatory pressures – making it much more 
difficult for one territory to choose, justify and enforce stricter levels 
of public regulation, in any situation where another territory follows 
more lax standards. The Act also risks creating a powerful disincen-
tive to engage in legal reform or innovation, in response to changing 
economic challenges or social preferences – since not only brand new 
regulatory initiatives, but also plans to amend existing rules in any 
substantive way, would immediately become subject to the UKIM’s 
market access principles.  
Yet the inherent design problems are only likely to grow still further 
when put into practice. After all: in the particular context of the UK, 
the Act’s strong market access principles, plus their inherent deregu-
latory pressures and disincentives to reform or innovate, simply will 
not operate in a neutral manner across the constituent territories. 
Taming England’s relative size and power would challenge any inter-
nal market system. Instead, the Act’s regime would positively mag-
nify England’s inherent advantages yet further and risk rendering the 
exercise of many devolved powers redundant in practice. English 
choices would be able to produce their full effects within Scotland 
 
41 There are other more technical points on which the UKIM rules differ from those 
already familiar under EU free movement law: e.g. the rather idiosyncratic definition 
of indirect discrimination used in section 8 UKIMA 2020; e.g. the exclusion from 
scrutiny under the Act of rules regulating or restricting the post-sale use of goods 
(which under EU law would be analysed in accordance with the caselaw following C-
110/05, Commission v Italy, ECLI:EU:C:2009:66). 
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and Wales, on a scale that could simply overwhelm the latter’s own 
preferences. In effect: the UKIMA 2020 will subject the exercise of 
various devolved competences to the operation of market forces – yet 
in a market which is inherently, if not altogether dysfunctionally, 
skewed in favour of one dominant territory.  
Furthermore: unlike the EU system, there is no clear and conscious 
attempt by the UK Government and Westminster Parliament to de-
fine the relationship between the general principles that will govern 
cross-border commerce by default; and the role to be performed by 
centralised harmonisation or other forms of politically negotiated so-
lutions to potential trade problems. Indeed, the relationship between 
market access principles under the Act, on the one hand, and a pro-
ject like ‘common frameworks’, on the other hand, has been left de-
liberately ambiguous. The UKIMA 2020 simply confers upon the 
central executive a power to amend the list of express exemptions 
from the market access principles for goods as laid down in Schedule 
1; and states that that power might be exercised, inter alia, to give 
effect to a common framework agreement between the UK govern-
ment and one or more devolved administrations about how matters 
previously governed by EU law should be regulated after expiry of 
the post-Brexit transition period.42 But arguably, the Act is so ex-
treme in its vision and design that it points towards an implicit an-
swer to the question about harmonisation versus mutual recognition: 
who needs ‘common frameworks’ at all, if market forces will do the 
job themselves, based on the overwhelming extra-territorial effects of 
whatever standards England choses to adopt? 
And unlike the EU system: there are no guarantees that the UKIM 
will operate according to certain minimum common standards in 
fields such as the environment, consumers and employment protec-
tion. Indeed, it is clear from the UKIMA 2020 that any good mar-
keted in England even in the total absence of any relevant public inter-
est regulation, is still entitled to benefit from the principle of mutual 
recognition when it comes to sale or supply in Scotland or Wales. 
And again unlike the EU system: there is no attempt to combine the 
 
42 Section 10. 
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new UKIM principles with reforms to the UK’s overall governance 
structures, for example, so as to create more independent and impar-
tial fora for decision-making and dispute resolution between the con-
stituent territories. Far from it: the UKIMA 2020 confers significant 
powers upon the central executive to change the rules of the game 
laid down in the Act itself and even without the consent of the de-
volved authorities.43 At the same time, the conferral of direct legal en-
forceability upon the core market access principles contained in the 
Act would only serve to render its potential impacts and problems 
even more potent in practice, as the courts would be called upon to 
disapply devolved rules that fall foul of the Act’s turbocharged sys-
tem of mutual recognition and non-discrimination.44  
So on paper, devolution might continue to look the same. Indeed, 
it might even look more extensive. But in practice, the operation of 
the UKIM has real potential to limit the capacity of the devolved in-
stitutions to pursue different economic or social choices from those 
made in London. 
It is arguable that the underlying problems affecting the UKIMA 
2020 lie in its core starting assumptions: that regulatory differences 
capable of creating any barrier to trade are inherently objectionable 
and must be suppressed in practice; and that those barriers to trade 
will emanate primarily from the actions of the Scottish or Welsh au-
thorities, never from choices made in London. But in reality, the 
main challenge facing the UKIM does not lie in the ability of Scot-
land or Wales to do certain things differently from England in accord-
ance with their legitimate powers under their own devolution settle-
ments. The real problem is the sheer empirical fact that, without 
 
43 E.g. section 6(5)-(9) on the definition of rules subject to non-discrimination; 
section 8(7)-(11) on the legitimate aims capable of justifying indirect discrimination; 
section 10(2)-(11) on exclusions from the market access principles as laid down in 
Schedule 1. Note section 13 on review of those delegated amendment powers; and 
sections 56-57 on the general scope of executive powers under the Act.  
44 Note also the controversial powers contained in Part 6 (whereby the UK 
Government can directly fund a wide variety of projects across the UK and regardless 
of devolved powers); Part 7 (categorisation of subsidy control as a competence 
reserved to the central UK authorities); and section 54 (protection of the UKIMA 
2020 against modification by the devolved institutions).  
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proper constraints and processes, a strong UKIM system will mag-
nify England’s existing economic and constitutional dominance yet 
further – and do so to the clear cost of devolution itself. 
For those reasons, it is tempting to regard the UKIMA 2020 as so 
flawed that it should be scrapped at the earliest opportunity and the 
entire design of internal UK trade reimagined from first principles. 
For example: one might propose that the unique characteristics of 
the UK are best reflected in avoiding any system of direct legal en-
forceability at the behest of individual traders; in favour of an effec-
tive system of pre-legislative dialogue between the competent author-
ities from across the UK – allowing potential internal trade problems 
to be identified and resolved even before they arise; while insisting 
that any potential barriers which are eventually enacted in law must 
then be accepted as a fact of economic and regulatory life by all rele-
vant traders. That would place the emphasis back on finding a satis-
factory approach to the development and implementation of ‘com-
mon frameworks’. In some sectors, the solution might well be full-
scale harmonisation. In other sectors, it might be possible to reach 
agreement on a system of mutual recognition, but subject to more 
appropriate or extensive opportunities for derogation and justifica-
tion. And in some fields, it might be best simply to allow internal 
trade barriers to arise and expect businesses to adapt to them – be-
cause that is what the responsible political actors agree would strike 
the best balance between the competing public interests at stake.  
But even for such a system of pre-legislative dialogue and political 
management to work smoothly and effectively, there would need to 
be major changes to the way the UK currently operates. For example, 
one would ideally want the cooperative political resolution of trade 
issues to be settled against the background of an agreed definition 
over the minimum ‘flanking policies’ required to prevent principles 
such as mutual recognition from morphing into a tool for unfair 
trade practices and harmful social dumping. Similarly: one would 
ideally want a system of pre-legislative dialogue to take place within 
a political and constitutional culture that values devolution and re-
spects the prerogatives of the democratic institutions of Scotland and 
Wales. Systematically undermining the Sewell Convention, and 
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allowing the UK’s central institutions to overrule their devolved col-
leagues at will, does not build the sort of mutual trust that is needed 
for the long term stability and credibility of the UKIM.  
Even if such radical redesign options are hoping for too much, the 
basic scheme of the UKIMA 2020 could nevertheless be improved in 
smaller but still significant ways. For example: the Act could be 
amended so as to provide a much broader system of derogations and 
justifications, allowing an individual territory to refuse mutual recog-
nition or defend trade discrimination where its local regulations are 
justified for the protection of a much wider range of public interest 
objectives – as happens in the EU Single Market. After all: even if one 
cannot change the empirical and constitutional fact of English dom-
inance, and even if the central UK authorities are unwilling simply to 
substitute a system of pre-legislative dialogue for the legally binding 
market access principles now contained in the Act, we could still take 
Cassis de Dijon off its steroids and live, at least for a while, with a 
more fairly balanced system of internal trade rules. 
6.   Concluding Remarks 
The UK as such may be a latecomer to the global club of internal 
market making. But the British did spend 45 years as leading mem-
bers of one of the most advanced and sophisticated internal markets 
in the world. Which makes it all the more surprising that so many of 
the core features that make the EU system so acceptable and indeed 
attractive to its participants, have simply been expunged from the 
UK Government’s plans for the design and operation of the British 
version.  
As it stands under the 2020 Act, the UKIM is characterised by a 
default rule of market access based on a decidedly distorted reading 
of Cassis de Dijon. There are no clear principles to govern the alter-
native strategy of centralised harmonisation or collective regulatory 
coordination. There are no enforceable minimum standards in cru-
cial flanking fields such as labour and environmental standards. 
There are no changes to a highly problematic governance framework, 
of the sort that would promote more independent and impartial 
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institutions and processes. Most of all: there is not even a flicker of 
recognition for the unique circumstances of the UK, in which one 
territory, out of just four, occupies a position of not merely relative 
but absolute and indeed overwhelming dominance over the others.  
All of which makes one suspect that the problems of the UKIMA 
2020 are not just a reflection of subtle differences in government 
preferences about the challenges of cross-border trade and the solu-
tions for market management, but instead reveal a much deeper and 
stronger antipathy by the current Conservative administration to-
wards a more fundamental set of constitutional arrangements and 
relationships: devolution itself. In that regard, it is important to high-
light that the UKIMA 2020 was itself adopted without the consent 
of the Scottish Parliament or the Welsh Senedd. Far from it: the gov-
ernments in both Edinburgh and Cardiff accused London of a uni-
lateral and shameless power-grab that undermines UK democracy 
and risks weakening still further its own composite yet fragile un-
ion.45  
There is no parallel universe in which Brexit is as entertaining as 
K563 or the Goldbergs. But Brexit still manages to provide us with 
the occasional hint of, albeit unintended, irony: the ferocious effort 
that hard core British Europhobes have invested in undermining the 




45 Consider, e.g. Scottish Government, Legislative Consent Memorandum: United 
Kingdom Internal Market Bill (28 September 2020) available via 
parliament.scot/S5_Finance/General%20Documents/SPLCM-S05-47.pdf. 
